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SPECIAL CONTRIBUTION
ORIGINALISM AND THE LEGISLATURE
Abstract
While the extent to which Congress ought to be involved in
interpreting the Constitution has been the subject of scholarly debate in
recent years, the question of how Congress should interpret the document
has been overlooked. This paper examines the justifications underlying
several schools of originalist thought to tease out what these schools have to
say about congressional constitutional interpretation. When the major
originalist theories are scrutinized, the logical conclusion is that Congress
ought to be originalist when engaging in constitutional interpretation. The
paper thus breaks new ground in pointing out this radical implication of
originalist thought, but its novel exploration of congressional interpretive
methods makes it highly relevant to nonoriginalist scholars as well.
INTRODUCTION
Contemporary interpretivists permit the electorally accountable
officials substantial leeway. The Congress can interpret the tenth
amendment and the necessary and proper clause virtually as it pleases
....

[I]n the area of individual rights, the so-called interpretivists,by

and large, presume that the legislature has virtually unfettered
discretion unless there is a specific prohibition placed upon their
powers by the Constitution.

Much has been made in recent years of the reincarnation of
originalism as a constitutional interpretive method. The literature on
originalism, from nonoriginalists and originalists alike,2 has described a

1. Gary C. Leedes, A Critique of Illegitimate Noninterpretivism, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 533,

539 (1983).
2. Stephen Griffin has argued, "Scholars today distinguish among forms of originalism, not
between originalism and nonoriginalism." Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism,2008 U.
ILL. L. REv. 1185, 1193 (2008). However, I think the distinction is still valid as argued by Keith
E. Whittington. See Keith E. Whittington, Dworkin's "Originalism;" The Role of Intentions in

ConstitutionalInterpretation, 62 THE REV. OF POL. 197, 197 n.2 (2000). Thus, this paper does
assume that a distinction exists between originalists and nonoriginalists, and the fact that Dworkin
is excluded as an originalist should give the reader some idea of what originalism does not mean
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rebirth of the methodology, terming it the "new originalism."3 This theme
in the literature indicates a desire among scholars to look with new eyes at
originalist theory, and it provides the opportunity to take up questions that
heretofore have received scant attention in originalist scholarship. For all
the attention that has been paid to important questions of oriiinalist
theory-such as collective intentionalism or the dead-hand problem -- one
that has been conspicuously overlooked is the question of what implications
originalism has for congressional constitutional interpretation. While there
has been a recent renewal of interest in extrajudicial constitutional
interpretation, the literature has focused almost exclusively on the extent to
which the national Legislature ought to have a role in interpretation 8 while
ignoring the question of how Congress ought to interpret. This paper
contends that some of the principal schools of originalist thought require
originalism in congressional constitutional interpretation, though it does not
offer a descriptive account of how Congress interprets.9 Rather, it focuses
on how Congress should interpret the Constitution in light of various

in this context.
3. See JOHNATHAN

G. O'NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 204-05

(2005); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 620-29

(1999); Griffin, supra note 2, at 1188-96; Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism,2 GEO. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 599 (2004).

4. Of course, because this paper does not argue for what originalism is or should be, I use
"theory" expansively in this context and do not mean to suggest that there is one theory of
originalism.
5. The problem of collective intentionalism or the so-called summing problem argues that it
is impossible to discern what multiple founders or ratifiers intended when they approved the
constitutional text. The argument is that each ratifier had his own view of what the text meant,
and that aggregating these views is analytically problematic. See generally RAOUL BERGER,
CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 47-119 (1969); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 187-95 (1999);

Paul Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the Original Understanding,60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980).

6. The dead-hand problem questions the idea that those living under the Constitution today
are bound by the actions or intentions of their predecessors. This line of argument is deeply
skeptical of originalism because it seeks to bind today's citizens to the actions or textual
commands of the Constitution's ratifiers. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the
Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119 (1998); James A. Gardner, The Positivist Foundations
of Originalism: An Account and Critique, 71 B.U. L. REV. 1, 20-29 (1991); Michael W.
McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127 (1998);
Larry G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can OriginalistInterpretation

be Justified?, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1482, 1495-510 (1985).
7. See infra Section I.
8. Throughout the paper, I will refer to Congress or other branches participating in
"interpretation." Unless otherwise noted, I mean to say constitutional interpretation.
9. Such accounts have been offered before, though this field of research is still relatively
new. See infra Section I. While the last section of the paper touches on the issue of whether
Congress is capable of implementing originalism in its interpretations that is not the focus of this
paper.
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schools of originalist thought, which assumes that Congress does and
should have a role in constitutional interpretation.10
The paper proceeds in five sections. Section I is a rough (and by no
means comprehensive) sketch of the work that has been done relating to
congressional interpretation. The Section also seeks to clarify how the
purpose of this paper contrasts with the focus of past scholars. Sections IIV explain five schools of originalist thought and examine their implications
for congressional interpretation. Section II focuses on the originalist
theories of Robert Bork, William Rehnquist, and Edwin Meese; Section III
on Raoul Berger's Intentionalist School; Section IV on Steven Calabresi,
Saikrishna Prakash, and Michael Stokes Paulsen; and Section V on Randy
Barnett and Keith Whittington. As will be shown, the justification for each
originalist school logically leads them to embrace originalism in
congressional constitutional interpretation.
It is important to begin,
however, with a look at what has been said about con~pessional
interpretation in recent literature, which is the subject of Section I.
I. CONGRESSIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
While the topic of how Congress should interpret the Constitution has
10. 1 take no sides in this paper in the dispute over how much interpretive authority Congress
ought to have. I suggest only that the Legislature should have some role in the interpretive
enterprise, however minute. Even the most ardent of judicial supremacists should be able to
concede this rather modest claim, since Congress necessarily interprets whenever it passes
legislation. See Jack M. Balkin, FrameworkOriginalism and the Living Constitution, 103 Nw. U.

L. REv. 549, 568-70 (2009) ("However, every Congressional enactment passed under the
commerce power, and every appropriation under the General Welfare Clause, involves an implicit
interpretation of these clauses, whether or not any court ever considers them.").
11. Obviously, I am leaving out many prominent and important figures involved in the
originalism debates. Henry P. Monaghan, Michael McConnell, Antonin Scalia, and Jack Balkin
are just a few of the numerous influential scholars who could have been included in this paper, but
I necessarily had to limit the analysis to a few of the most prominent contributors to the
development of originalist theory. For example, Justice Scalia is clearly important in the
intellectual history of originalism, but as Paulsen and Kesavan have pointed out, "[E]ven though
Justice Scalia remains the dominant figure in the shift to originalist textualism, his is not always
the most refined or consistent version of the theory. In some ways, he is a leader whose followers
have bettered the leader's own work." Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret DraftingHistory, 91 GEo. L.J. 1113, 1140 (2003).

While I am not as critical of Scalia's originalism as these two authors, I do think that scholars tend
to articulate more consistent theories than practicing originalists in the courtroom, and so it is
more useful to focus on those authors.
Balkin, while being prominent in recent originalist scholarship, professes a breed of
originalism which is simply a more complicated case than I thought prudent to address in this
paper. Whereas the originalists discussed in this paper all seemingly agree, in a broad sense, on a
conception of what the original meaning is, Balkin's "framework originalism" is different in kind
from these other authors. See Balkin, supra note 10, at 550. For this reason, I set him aside for
the limited purpose of this paper.
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not been fully addressed by scholars, some attention has been paid to
congressional interpretation, especially in the context of debates about
judicial review. Donald Morgan's book posits that judicial supremacy over
interpretation (what Morgan calls the "judicial monopoly") ignores the very
real historical basis for congressional involvement in interpreting the
document and the need, in Morgan's view, for Congress to actively link
policy and constitutional considerations, rather than viewing them as
He employs several case studies to demonstrate the
separable.
interconnectedness of constitutional issues with policy issues" and analyzes
numerous historical theories regarding the extent to which Congress ought
to be involved in interpreting the Constitution.14
Keith Whittington and Neal Devin's compilation on the topic of
extrajudicial constitutional interpretation largely continues in the same vein
as Morgan in analyzin the extent to which Congress should be part of the
The book's greatest contribution is in breaking
interpretive enterprise.
new ground by examining the machinery (committee system, etc.) of
Congress in constitutional interpretationl6 and the ways in which Congress
might act as an interpreter.17 This work was followed by Richard Bauman
and Tsvi Kahana's rich and valuable compilation on the legislative role in
"the constitutional state."' 8 While certainly representing a substantial
scholarly achievement, the essays contained in the book ignore the vital
question of how legislatures should interpret fundamental law.
This topic is similarly passed over in the burgeoning literature on
extrajudicial interpretation as it relates to judicial review. Mark Tushnet
and Jeremy Waldron have argued against judicial review and in favor of the
transfer of constitutional inte retation to the popular branches, principally
in the form of the Legislature. While legislative interpretation is touched

12. DONALD MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF RESPONSIBILITY
331-44 (1966).
13. Id. at 101-330.
For a much more extensive empirical and descriptive account of
14. Id. at 71-98.
congressional constitutional interpretation, see David Currie's four-volume series, which ends just
at the start of the Civil War. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE
FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801 (1997); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS:
THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801-1829 (2001); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS:
DESCENT INTO MAELSTROM, 1829-1861 (2005); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN
CONGRESS: DEMOCRATS AND WHIGS, 1829-1861 (2005).
15. See CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., 2005).
16. Id. at 18-150.
17. Id at 269-311.
18. See THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL STATE (Richard Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006).
19. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 129-76 (1999);
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upon in these works, the issue of the method of interpretation is never
discussed. For instance, Tushnet defends congressional interpretation from
the charge that legislators have largely abdicated such a role. He points to
what he calls "judicial overhang," by which he means, principally, that
"[l]egislators may define their jobs as excluding consideration of the
Tushnet and
Constitution precisely because the courts are there."21
Waldron then offer arguments for why Congress should interpret, but they
do not explain how it should do so.
Perhaps the book that has generated the most attention in the literature
Carefully
has been Larry Kramer's The People Themselves.22
reconstructing the history of judicial review, Kramer argues that American
constitutionalism was originally driven by ordinary citizens and their
elected representatives and only later evolved to ordain the Court with the
In arguing for "popular
supreme power over interpretation.23
constitutionalism," 24 Kramer advocates an anti-judicial supremacist view
that allows for judicial review in tandem with vibrant and active popular
branches and a watchful citizenry. The literature that has resulted from this
25
book has been extensive, but neither Kramer, nor those who have written
in response to his work, have addressed the issue of congressional
interpretive methodology.
Paul Brest's 1974 article on legislative interpretation is well known. It
focuses on "how a legislator seeking to assess the constitutionality of a
proposed law can find guidance in judicial decisions."26 Thus, Brest is less
concerned about how Congress ought to interpret in its own right, and
instead works under the assumption that judicial decisions are a primary
A more recent and
determinant of congressional interpretations.
comprehensive article is Neal Kumar Katyal's Legislative Constitutional
Interpretation,which advances the thesis that "constitutional interpretation
JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 282-312 (1999).

20. TUSHNET, supra note 19, at 54-71.

21. Id.at 58.
22. LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).
THEMSELVES:
POPULAR
KRAMER,
THE
PEOPLE
23. See
generally LARRY
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).
24. Id.
25. See Symposium, A Symposium on the People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalismand
Judicial Review, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 809 (2006); Symposium, The Brennan Center Jorde
Symposium on ConstitutionalLaw, 92 CAL. L. REV. 959 (2004) (making a case for some form of
"popular constitutionalism," rather than speaking to methodology). The Chicago-Kent symposium
is especially extensive and highlights the great impact of Kramer's book.

26. Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27
STAN. L. REV. 585, 589 (1975).
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by Congress is, and should be, quite different from constitutional
interpretation by courts." 2 7 While Katyal's argument may seem germane to
this paper, he arrives at his conclusion via a nonoriginalist "living
28
Constitution" perspective. Because this paper operates under the different
assumption that the best method of interpreting the Constitution is
originalism, Katyal's claims have much less force. Furthermore, as
mentioned above, the purpose of this paper is not to examine how
interpretations differ among the various branches or whether originalism
can be implemented in the Legislature; it is to look at whether, as a
normative matter, various originalist theories mandate originalist
congressional interpretation. Katyal's analysis, while important, is thus not
directly relevant to this paper.
As stated earlier, this section is by no means exhaustive, as there are
myriad other works that could be mentioned here. Certainly, Whittington's
book on judicial supremacy is an important piece of the literature, as is his
landmark book on the role of popular branches in constitutional
29
However, the purpose of this section is not to provide a
construction.
detailed account of the literature on congressional interpretation. Instead, it
surveys the literature to illustrate the dearth of scholarship on the topic of
this paper and discusses the reasons why this investigation is worthwhile.
With this general background in mind, the first school of originalist thought
is examined, along with its implications for congressional constitutional
interpretation.
II. THE PROPER ROLE SCHOOL
Arguably, one way of teasing out the implications of originalism for
congressional interpretation would be to present a more general originalist
theory and proceed from there. This method is not viable because there is,
in truth, no single theory of originalism, but rather many schools of
originalist thought, at least from a purely descriptive perspective on the
literature. Indeed, even those whose views seem counter to fundamental
originalist tenets now call themselves originalists and contend that a
27. Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335, 1335
(2001).
28. Id at 1337-39.
29. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY
(2007); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL
WHITTINGTON,
(1999)
[hereinafter
MEANING
CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTIONS]; see also Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation:
Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REv. 773 (2002) (offering reasons why extrajudicial

constitutional interpretations should be regarded as authoritative and deserving of greater
deference).
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distinction between originalism and nonoriginalism does not exist.30 As
such, distinct originalist camps and their underlying justifications must be
identified and explained.
Scholars are grouped according to the
justifications offered for their originalist theories, as well as the principal
concerns they express about interpretation. Surely, these theorists could be
grouped in alternative ways were the aim of this paper different. Only after
such a taxonomic exercise is it possible to determine whether originalist
theories lead to originalism in congressional interpretation.
The first school of thought is the Proper Role School. This school is
exemplified by the writings of Judge Robert Bork, though it also includes
former Chief Justice William Rehnquist 3 I and former Attorney General
Edwin Meese. 32 All three figures share an overriding concern with the
proper role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional scheme. To them,
originalism is seen as the best way of achieving the goal of a more modest
Judiciary.33 This somewhat crude characterization does not imply that these
men do not have nuanced and well-developed political theories underlying
their essentially pragmatic worldview, but it does mean that their rationale
has a strong power balancing element.
In 1971, Robert Bork published his seminal Indiana Law Review
article on the need for "neutral principles" in constitutional interpretation.34
Bork's originalism centers on the idea of the Supreme Court's role in the
"Madisonian Dilemma," 35 by which he means the notion that the
30. See supra note 2. The relevant distinction between originalists and nonoriginalists is why
I do not include, for example, Ronald Dworkin in this analysis. A very strong case could be made
that several scholars currently identified as originalists are not, in fact, within the originalist fold,
including Barnett. However, I have tried to refrain from excluding those scholars who are widely
considered to be originalists from this analysis, and Barnett is certainly one of them. Dworkin, by
contrast, has never really been embraced by originalists; nor has he made a strong claim to the
label.
31. See generally William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of the Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L.

REV. 693 (1976).
32. See ELDER WITr, A DIFFERENT JUSTICE: REAGAN AND THE SUPREME COURT 135-38

(1986) (describing Meese's urging of a literal interpretation); Edwin Meese, III, Speech Before the
American Bar Association, Washington, D.C., July 9, 1985, in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTERCENTURY OF DEBATE 47-54 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007). Neither Rehnquist nor Meese have

identical justifications for their views as Bork, but the overall idea of the need to constrain the
Judiciary is the dominant theme for all three writers.
33. This power balancing theme in Bork's writings in particular has been noted by
Whittington. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 5, at 39, 45.
34. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,

1-7(1971).
35. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW

139 (1990). While Bork certainly articulates the idea of the Madisonian Dilemma in his article,
see Bork, supra note 34, at 1-4, only in his book is this term used extensively to encapsulate his
argument. Id.

520

Loyola Law Review

[Vol. 56

Constitution protects minorities while at the same time empowering
majorities, thus attempting to maintain a balance that prevents either
majority or minority tyranny. Because the Court is viewed as the supreme
interpreter and arbiter between these two competing tyrannies, the
"dilemma imposes severe requirements upon the Court. For it follows that
the Court's power is legitimate only if it has . . . a valid theory, derived

from the Constitution, of the respective spheres of majority and minority
freedom."37 For the Court to merely impose its own value system on any
given constitutional dispute would require it to take sides in the struggle
between tyrannies without any basis in the Constitution, thus underminin
the legitimacy of both the constitutional decision and the Court.
Originalism, according to Bork, is the best constitutional interpretive
method because of its ability to provide the judge with a neutral source
39
upon which to base his decision.
The Proper Role School strongly embraces Thayer's Rule, as stated by
Bork: "Courts must accept any value choice the legislature makes unless it
clearly runs contrary to a choice made in the framing of the Constitution."40
Bork also relieves Congress of the responsibility to enforce the original
meaning of the Constitution when it engages in constitutional interpretation
by stating "[t]o be perfectly clear on the subject, I repeat that [the theory of
neutral principles] is not applicable to legislatures. Legislation requires
value choice and cannot be principled in the sense under discussion." 4 1
Because the Proper Role School views originalism as a means of restraining
judges within the Madisonian system, it is consistent that these originalists
would see no need for originalism in congressional interpretation.
The Proper Role School's views on congressional interpretation
converge in an interesting way. The school absolves Congress of the need
for principled constitutional interpretation, but it also demands strict
deference to legislative enactments. The logical result, in the words of
Gregory Bassham, is a "clear-mistake originalism" 42 that "requires judges
in some cases not to enforce what seems on balance to be the best

36. Bork, supra note 34, at 3.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 4.
39. BORK, supra note 35, at 143-60. Both in his book and in the article, Bork goes into greater
detail than is warranted here about why originalism provides neutral principles for adjudicating
constitutional disputes. His concern is both with neutral "derivation" of principles as well as with
the neutral "application" of those principles. Id. at 146-47, 51-53. None of this is terribly relevant
for the purpose of this paper.
40. Bork, supra note 34, at 10-11.
41. Id. at 10.
42. GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE CONSTITUTION 40 (1992).
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originalist reading of a particular constitutional provision."4 3 The Proper
Role School thus allows Congress to take sides in the Madisonian Dilemma
in a way that it finds unconscionable when done by the Court. One
naturally wonders why it is appropriate for Congress to choose between
majority and minority tyranny, but unacceptable for the Court to do so.
Proper Role supporters would likely respond in three ways. First, they
might argue that, because they assume judicial supremacy in constitutional
interpretation, only the Court faces the Madisonian Dilemma in any real
sense. Congress can pass legislation untethered to neutral principles
because the Court has ultimate responsibility for interpretation and can
remedy any mistakes. Section V of this paper gives a more full response to
this general line of argumentation, but with regard to the Proper Role
School, such an argument lacks force. A theory cannot simultaneously
demand strict deference to legislative enactments and claim that judicial
oversight of legislation is a sufficient check on abuses of power. The latter
claim requires a searching and vigorous judicial role, and that is
incompatible with the judicial restraint at the heart of the Proper Role
School.
Second, rather than implicitly concede this point, Proper Role
advocates could make an affirmative case for congressional enactments of
dubious constitutionality. The above response from the Proper Role School
seems to concede that it is, at least in some important sense, unacceptable
for Congress to stretch the limits of its constitutional authority. In response,
the advocates might argue, as Bork would, that Congress is forced to make
value choices as part of legislating and that these value choices are, by
However, the argument for an originalist
definition, not neutral.44
Legislature does not deny that Congress makes value choices; it contends
that those value choices must be made within the same interpretive
framework expected of the Judiciary. The Bork argument about value
choices, therefore, misses the point. The fact that Congress must make
value choices does not mean that those decisions are without limits.
Something more would be required to draw a distinction between Congress
and the Court.45
Finally, Proper Role supporters could argue that Congress is more
legitimate than the Court in pushing constitutional boundaries by virtue of
popular election. Because Congress reflects the will of the people, it
theoretically has a mandate to make such decisions, or so the argument

43. BASSHAM, supra note 42, at 4-5.
44. See Bork, supra note 34, at 10.
45. See discussion infra Section V.
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would go. The problem with the legitimacy argument is that, like the value
choices argument, it does not provide a reason against imposing originalism
on the Legislature. Even granting that Congress has more legitimacy in
stretching constitutional limits than the Court does, originalism allows for
reasonable actors to come to different conclusions about the meaning of a
constitutional provision. Depending on the theory of originalism and the
level of generality used to define the text, an originalist Congress might
come to a much more permissive view of its powers under the Interstate
Commerce Clause 4 6 than an originalist Supreme Court. Originalism, in
other words, allows for the kind of congressional boundary-pushing that the
Proper Role School claims is legitimate; the two are not necessarily in
opposition to each other.
The only ways in which originalism would be diametrically opposed
to this expansive view of congressional power would be if an especially
restrictive theory of originalism were imposed on Congress or if the Proper
Role School advocated a totally unrestrained Legislature. But members of
the Proper Role School do, in fact, allow for some flexibility in
interpretation. As Judge Bork has said: "Nothing about interpreting the
Constitution can be precise

. . . .

[Interpretation is] not a mathematical

exercise. It's a question of judgment."4 7 Indeed, Bork's view of the Equal
Protection Clause allows for a level of generality that might trouble
48
originalists who advocate more narrow views of original meaning.
Furthermore, the Proper Role School does not go so far as to advocate
unlimited congressional interpretive authority. Thus, there does not appear
to be a viable argument for the school to require originalism of the Judiciary
but not of the Legislature. That alone is not enough to require an originalist
Legislature. But when coupled with the fact that Congress can just as easily
impose majority (or even minority) tyranny as the Court, at least the Bork
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
47. Uncommon Knowledge: Robert's Rules of Order: A Conversation with Robert Bork

(Hoover Institution & KTEH broadcast July 16, 2003) [hereinafter Robert's Rules of Order],
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bRkhBav4ekA (last visited June 23, 2010). For a
transcript of the Robert Bork interview, visit the Hoover Institution's website at
http://www.hoover.org/multimedia/uk/2940316.html (last visited June 23, 2010).
48. See Robert's Rules of Order,supra note 47. Bork has explained that the Equal Protection
Clause was meant to establish a "basic principle of equality," and that while the ratifiers of the
Fourteenth Amendment might have thought school segregation satisfied that requirement,
subsequent experience showed that segregation violated the principle of the Equal Protection
Clause embodied in its words. Id. He argues that it was proper for the Court in Brown v. Board of
Education to apply the principle in light of subsequent experience, rather than to remain bound by
how the ratifiers expected the text to be implemented. Id. This level of generality would be
contested by some scholars, and others would argue it is unnecessary to justify Brown. See
generally Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the DesegregationDecisions, 81 VA. L. REV.

947 (1995).
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followers within the Proper Role School are obligated to accept originalism
as the preferred method of congressional constitutional interpretation.
Moreover, the other Proper Role advocates have to provide a much more
compelling account than they have for why Congress ought not be
originalist.
III. THE INTENTIONALIST SCHOOL
The Proper Role School is thus rooted in a distinct view of the
appropriate and restrained role of the Court in the constitutional system,
with originalism being justified by that role. By contrast, the Intentionalist
School, best exemplified by Raoul Berger's originalism, is primarily
grounded in the idea that the original intention of the Founders requires
originalism. Berger's well-known and important debate with H. Jefferson
Powell about how the Framers intended the Constitution to be interpreted
was so important to Berger precisely because Powell's thesis undermined
Berger's main justification for originalism. 49 Berger thus based his
originalism principally on the Founders' intent-regardless of what that
might be.so
Berger's originalism led him to favor judicial restraint. He argued
against the idea of judges taking a proactive role in settling constitutional
controversies, instead seeing them as checks on clear abuses of legislative
power. In his consideration of Thayer's Rule, Berger tried to show that the
Founders had "refused to allocate a larger role to the judges than annulment
of laws that plainly went out of bounds."5 1 The Founders' wariness of
judicial power is demonstrated in "indications that judicial intervention was
49. See generally Raoul Berger, 'Original Intention' in Historical Perspective, 54 GEO.

WASH. L. REv. 296 (1986) (disputing Powell's historical account and reaffirming intentionalism);
Raoul Berger, The Founders' Views-According to Jefferson Powell, 67 TEX. L. REv. 1033
(1989); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understandingof Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REv.

885 (1985) (arguing that the Founders did not intend for their intentions about constitutional
meaning to guide interpretation); H. Jefferson Powell, The Modern MisunderstandingofOriginal

Intent, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1513 (1987). True, Berger argued that the reason the Founders
preferred intentionalism was that they had a "'profound fear' of judicial [independence and]
discretion" and sought to confine it.

Berger, The Founders' Views-According to Jefferson

Powell, supra, at 1065. It could be argued that this implicitly demonstrates that Berger was a
Proper Role originalist in the same vein as those mentioned above. But this argument is
ultimately unconvincing. Berger was, quite simply, quintessentially intentionalist. See Raoul
Berger, New Theories of 'Interpretation':The Activist Flightfrom the Constitution,47 OHIO ST.

L.J. 1, 16-27 (1986) [hereinafter New Theories].
50. One needs to look no further than his repeated argument that the Founder's intentions
trumped even the text of the Constitution. See New Theories,supra note 49, at 36 ("Wrapped in a
philosophical cocoon, Richards states, 'it is not a reasonable construction of the abstract language
employed to limit it forever to its historic denotations,' utterly oblivious to the long-established
rule that the intention of the lawmaker prevails over the letter of the law.") (footnotes omitted).
51. BERGER, supra note 5, at 343.
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envisaged only when encroachments were plain." 5 2 A parallel can thus be
drawn with the Proper Role School's deference to legislative majorities and
the Intentionalist School's restraint ofjudicial authority.
The logic of the Intentionalist School, however, leads much more
readily to the conclusion that Congress should be originalist than did the
reasoning underlying the Proper Role School. The central argument made
by Berger time and again was that the intent of the lawmaker is binding; or,
as he stated in quoting the Supreme Court, "The intention of the lawmaker
is the law." 53 Berger was prolific in his attempts to show that this principle
was historically treated as orthodoxy in Anglo-American jurisprudence
prior to the twentieth century, arguing that "[r]espect for the intention of the
draftsmen goes back to medieval times.,,54 Only once this principle was
established could Berger point to the original intentions of the American
Founders to argue for originalism in the Judiciary.
The crucial point to recognize here is that Berger began with a general
theory of interpretation and then proceeded to argue for an originalist
Judiciary. But if the theory he advocates is actually a binding rule of
interpretation, there is no reason to demand that only the Court adhere to
this principle. If the original intent is law and the Founders expected that
the Constitution would be interpreted as such, then this must be the case for
all interpreters. Berger himself seems to recognize this at times in his
writings. Discussing Justice John Marshall's opinion in Marbury v.
Madison, Berger wrote approvingly:
Illimitable power runs counter to the Founders' determination to
"limit" all delegated power .

. .

. If the Constitution is alterable at the

pleasure of the Legislature (or the courts), [Marshall] continued, "then
written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to
limit a power, in its own nature illimitable."5 6
Berger's efforts to show that the Founders specifically intended for the
Court to be faithful to their intentions were therefore superfluous. Simply
by showing that the original intention of the Founders was the binding
mode of interpretation at the time of Ratification, Berger had a plausible
52. BERGER, supra note 5, at 344.
53. New Theories, supra note 49, at 20 (quoting Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 212

(1903)).
54. Id. This is why Berger's debate with Powell was so critical to his originalism. If Powell
could have successfully shown that historically the intention of the lawmaker was not binding, or
at least that the story was more complex than Berger portrayed it to be, the logic of the
Intentionalist School would have largely collapsed.
55. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
56. Raoul Berger, Some Reflections on Interpretivism, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 4 (1987).
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argument in favor of an originalist Judiciary. However, this same argument
logically leads one to conclude that the Court is not the only branch bound
by the Founders' intent; the Legislature must be subject to the same
constraints. The implication of the Intentionalist School's logic is an
originalist Legislature.
IV. THE CONSTITUTION-AS-STATUTE SCHOOL
Together, Saikrishna Prakash, Steven Calabresi, and Michael Stokes
Paulsen form the Constitution-as-Statute School of originalism. The name
is derived from their justifications for originalist theory. They assert that
the Constitution is like a statute and must be interpreted using similar
57
methods. Paulsen arrives at this conclusion by pointing to the Supremacy
Clause (he terms it the "Supreme Law Clause") as the primary justification
According to this argument, the Supremacy Clause
for originalism.
"establishes the text of the document-'this Constitution,' a written
document-as that which purports to be authoritative [and t]he document
itself thus appears to prescribe textualism (in some form or another) as the
proper mode of interpretation and application of the Constitution by those
holding office under it." 59 Calabresi and Prakash embrace this notion of the
primacy of the text and state, "It follows that the Constitution is thus like
other legal writings, including statutes. The meaning of all such legal
writings depends on their texts, as the were objectively understood by the
people who enacted or ratified them."
Because the Constitution-as-Statute School grounds its justification
57. Of course, this does not necessarily mean that these scholars agree on what those methods
ought to be, only that they view the Constitution in much the same way and justify their
originalism in light of this perspective. Prakash, for instance, while seeing the Constitution as
being just like any other legal document, also sees nothing special about the fact that the document
is a legal one. See generally Saikrishna B. Prakash, The Misunderstood Relationship Between
Originalism and Popular Sovereignty, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 485 (2008). He sees

originalism as the proper method of interpretation for any historical document whatever. See id. at
486 ("Legal documents generally ought to be understood through the originalist lens .... Indeed,
any text or utterance, legal or not, should be understood through the originalist lens."). The reader
might wonder if it is appropriate, given that Prakash sees nothing special about legal texts in
particular, to label him as though it were relevant to him that the Constitution was like a statute. I
contend that it is appropriate because Prakash himself makes the comparison between the
Constitution and statutes in terms of how to interpret the text. Id. The arguments for why he
should apply originalism to the Legislature are very similar to those used in the case of Paulsen,
for example, and so I think it is useful to group them together, even while keeping their
interpretive differences in mind.
58. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's
Secret DraftingHistory, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1127 (2003).
59. Id. at 1127-28.
60. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President'sPower to Execute the Laws,

104 YALE L.J. 541, 551-52 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
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for originalism in the nature of the Constitution itself, it is difficult to see
how its members can argue for their originalism to apply only to the
Judiciary. If the Constitution is like any other form of law and should be
interpreted as such, then only by disregarding the law can the Legislature be
justified in employing nonoriginalist methods of interpretation. It would
fundamentally undermine the basis of this school to selectively ignore the
text when the school is justified by reference to the nature of that very
document.
Of course, the three scholars might argue that the text can apply to
different branches in different ways, allowing for flexibility in
interpretation. This argument has two main problems. First, if the text can
be applied in different ways to different branches so as to justify
nonoriginalist legislative interpretation, this raises the question of why
originalism, specifically, should be applied to the Judiciary in the ways
prescribed by the Constitution-as-Statute School. The three theorists have
very specific methodologies that they claim follow from the status of the
text as law and must apply to the Court. But if the nature of the
Constitution means different things to different branches, then something
beyond the text-as-law argument is necessary to justify why these specific
methodologies naturally flow from the document with respect to the
Judiciary in particular. None of the theorists offers such an account, and
Paulsen's specifically disavows the need for one in declaring his theory
"self-referential[] .
This leads to the second problem with the argument: the words of the
authors themselves. Calabresi and Prakash declare that only in the case of
textual ambiguity is "a constitutional interpreter" allowed to go beyond the
62
text itself, and may do so only to seek out the original meaning. They do
not qualify their statement by restricting their reference of "a constitutional
interpreter" to the Judiciary, and it is easy to see why they do not do so. 63 If
the Constitution is like a statute and must be interpreted as such, then how
could these three scholars contend that the Court must interpret the text by
traditional modes of legal interpretation but that Congress is free from such
burdens? For Congress to interpret the Constitution in a manner other than
the one prescribed would be to carve out an exception to treating the text as
a statute. Paulsen's words are especially illuminating in this regard. He
specifically declares that the Constitution's meaning cannot be changed "by
any group or body" except by amendment. Paulsen then proceeds to say

61. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 58, at 1128.
62. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 60, at 554.
63. See id.

64. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 58, at 1130.
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that Congress "may not defacto alter the Constitution by ascribing its own,
new meaning to a constitutional requirement or prohibition . . . ." His
words, as well as those of Prakash and Calabresi, place all three theorists in
a tight bind to justify why Congress should be allowed to disregard
originalism. The Constitution-as-Statute School's arguments in favor of
originalism and the words used by its members strongly imply an obligation
on the part of Congress to adhere to originalism in its constitutional
interpretations.
V. THE BARNETT AND WHITTINGTON SCHOOLS
While the Constitution-as-Statute School emphasizes the nature of the
Constitution and assumes the legitimacy of the document, Randy Barnett
justifies originalism by virtue of the Constitution's illegitimacy, at least as
far as legitimacy is understood to be derived from popular consent. In
Barnett's view, the "conditions necessary for 'We the People' actually to
consent to anything like the Constitution or amendments thereto have never
existed and could never exist." 66 The reason why these conditions have
never existed is that Barnett requires unanimous consent of those who
would be governed under a compact for it to attain popular legitimacy.67
Barnett suggests an alternative view of legitimacy "based on the existence
of procedures that protect natural rights."68 This concept of legitimacy
requires that whenever "we move outside a community constituted by
unanimous consent, every freedom-restricting law must be scrutinized to
see if it is necessary to protect the rights of others without improperly
violating the rights of those whose freedom is being restricted." 6 9 Barnett
thus stresses originalism as "a vital means of subjecting lawmakers to limits
on their lawmaking powers."7 0 Barnett continues, "[o]nly if lawmakers
cannot change the sco e of their own powers can the rights of the people be
Originalism becomes integral to preserving the
in any way assured."'
lawmaking procedures which can assure the protection of rights and,
therefore, the legitimacy of the Constitution. This unique originalist theory
constitutes the Randy Barnett School.
Keith Whittington's originalism, in contrast to Barnett's, assumes the
popular legitimacy of the Constitution. In examining constitutional
65. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 58, at 1130.
66. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 14 (2004).

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 14-31.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 117 (2004).
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72

interpretation, Whittington employs two primary arguments in favor of his
originalism: the written nature of the Constitution mandates originalism and
popular sovereignty also requires it. 7 3 Within the argument relating to the
written nature of the Constitution, Whittington makes three sub-arguments.
The first is a historical argument grounded in the American colonial
experience under the unwritten British constitution. 4 Recognizing how the
indeterminacy of the unwritten British constitution led to the abuses that
precipitated the Revolution, the Founders sought to permanently define
certain core principles and procedures, such that the Constitution "should
not change with the passage of time, as the common law necessarily
[did]." 75 The second sub-argument asserts that the Constitution can only be
76
understood as fundamental "law" if its meaning is fixed and determinate.
This is due to the fact that an undefined Constitution would not lend itself
to judicial enforceability and the idea that "[t]he process of ratification, the
appeal to the sovereign people in convention, makes sense only in the
context of a written document." 7 7 Finally, the third sub-argument is that a
78
law is necessarily connected with the intent of the lawmaker. Whittington
72. Whittington distinguishes between constitutional interpretation and constitutional
construction. Construction, in Whittington's view, occurs when the Court or political branches
give meaning to constitutional provisions whose original meaning is not discoverable or when the
branches implement practices and procedures that give life to the original meaning.
WHITTINGTON, supra note 5, at 5-14. Constructions are not "constitutionalized" in the sense that
they are subject to being overturned at any time since they are not actually found in the text of the
Constitution. Id. However, constructions cannot be inconsistent with the text. Id. For example,
the Political Question Doctrine would be considered a constitutional construction. Id.; see also
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTIONS, supranote 29.

The implication of Whittington's notion of constitutional construction is that Congress (as
well as the Court, to a lesser extent) may engage in construction, which is inherently
nonoriginalist. Assuming Whittington is right about the need for constructions, I am in agreement
with him on this point, but it is not immediately relevant to this paper. Here, I am addressing the
issue of congressional constitutional interpretation, not construction. The fact that originalist
theory leads to the conclusion that legislatures should be originalist in their interpretations does
not mean that they cannot participate in construction that is consistent with the text.
.For example, Congress may believe that an originalist reading of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause allows the death penalty. That does not mean, however, that Congress could
not forbid the death penalty in federal cases on the grounds that it believed capital punishment to
be cruel and unusual. In other words, Congress could still invoke the Constitution's provisions to
engage in construction because those constructions would not be constitutionalized; they would
merely be statutory and would not alter the original meaning or interpretation.
73. See generally WHITTINGTON, supra note 5.
74. Id. at 50-53.
75. Id. at 52.
76. Id. at 53-59.
77. Id.at 5.
78. Id. at 59-61. Whittington develops all three of these arguments in more detail in
examining three nonoriginalist counterarguments, which he outlines in Chapter 3 and then refutes
in Chapter 4. See id. at 61-109.
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argues that intent is inseparable from the written word, particularly when it
comes to legal texts. "To search for intent is not an attempt to avoid
language in search of something hidden by it. Rather, meaning, or
intention, is embedded in the language itself, is realized with the
utterance." 7 9 These three sub-arguments combine with refutations of
related nonoriginalist counterargument to comprise Whittington's defense
of originalism on the grounds of the "writtenness" of the Constitution.
Whittington's second argument in favor of originalism is rooted in
popular sovereignty. Because this argument's complexity makes it very
difficult to describe in brief, and because Whittington's arguments on the
writtenness of the Constitution provide a sufficient basis for evaluating his
view on congressional constitutional interpretation, the popular sovereignty
claim will not be summarized. 0 However, in concluding this sketch of
Whittington's originalism, it is worth noting that he absolves the political
branches from engaging in the necessary legal and scholarly research
involved in originalist constitutional interpretation, stating that it is unlikely
the branches would ever do so.8 In fact, Whittington goes even further by
stating that "originalism already implicitly assumes that the legislature
operates with a different interpretive standard from the judiciary's, a result
of its different role in a constitutional system." 8 2 Therefore, the Whittington
and Barnett Schools both assume that Congress will operate under a
different interpretive method than the Courts.
The use of originalism as a means of constraining legislative
majorities and guaranteeing civil rights is central to Barnett's thinking.
Given that his purpose is to restrict legislative action using originalism, the
most appropriate way to accomplish this would seemingly be for
originalism to apply both to the Judiciary and the Legislature. Barnett's
proposed solution to the problem is only a half measure. If legislative
majorities must be kept in check and their actions placed under intense
scrutiny, would not originalism in legislative interpretation more readily
achieve those goals? At first glance, Barnett's own rationale impels him to
impose originalism on the branches of government.
Barnett's response to this argument would likely highlight what he
would see as the needlessness of such a proposal. Because he assumes
(indeed, he advocates) judicial supremacy over constitutional interpretation,
so long as the Court is originalist, there is no need for the Legislature to be
so. This is especially true since Barnett's vision of the Court would be that
79. WHIrTINGTON, supra note 5, at 59.
80. Id. at 110-59.
8 1. Id. at 78.
82. Id.
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of an activist Judiciary, not one that deferred to legislative majorities to any
significant extent. But this argument rests on two faulty assumptions. First,
it assumes that every abuse of legislative power or every encroachment on
civil liberties can be redressed by the Court. For Barnett to say otherwise
would be to admit that his solution does not fully protect against legislative
abuses, in which case the rationale for applying originalism to Congress is
strong. But of course the Court cannot adjudicate every constitutional
dispute. There are some that it has decided are beyond its purview, such as
in the case of the Political Question Doctrine. There are also other legal
constructions and procedures which limit what cases the justices will hear.
For instance, the standing requirement leads to the dismissal of some cases
that involve vital constitutional principles and fundamental civil liberties.
One prominent and recent example was ACLU v. NSA, in which the federal
government's secret surveillance program created a significant
constitutional controversy and was alleged to have violated the civil rights
The case was, however, dismissed by the United
of several individuals.
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for lack of standing, which
demonstrates that even high-profile cases where courts are pressured to
issue a decision may never be decided on the merits.
Barnett might argue that his model presumes a Court that substantially
loosened or did away entirely with procedures that prevented cases from
being heard by the Court. But even if this were the case, the second
assumption inherent in his theory poses a real problem: it assumes that the
Court will virtually always make the correct decision in a case. If he did
not assume this to be true, then Barnett would have to concede that his
system was inadequate or at least imperfect as it relates to protecting civil
liberties and ensuring fair procedures. But if Barnett conceded that his
system could use improvement then he would have little reason not to
accept originalism in the Legislature. Instead, he assumes that the
supremacist Court will make the correct decisions in almost every case. Of
course, this assumption is entirely unrealistic. One need only highlight a
few of the Court's questionable decisions to prove this point. The result is
a system in which disputes involving vital constitutional questions may be
left unresolved by the Court; and even if these cases are addressed by the
Court, it might erroneously favor the legislative majority and trample on the

83. ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 648-51 (6th Cir. 2007).
84. Id. at 657 ("Therefore, the injury that would support a declaratory judgment action (i.e.,
the anticipated interception of communications resulting in harm to the contacts) is too
speculative, and the injury that is imminent and concrete (i.e., the burden on professional
performance) does not support a declaratory judgment action."); see also Elk Grove Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
85. Rehnquist, supra note 31, at 700-04.
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rights of citizens. This result argues convincingly for applying originalism
to legislative constitutional interpretation.
Interestingly, despite his substantial differences with Barnett in
justifying originalism, Whittington's school could be criticized for
implicitly making the same argument about judicial supremacy and for
depending on the same two assumptions in making that argument. Two of
Whittington's three arguments supporting his claim about the nature of a
written constitution are equally applicable to the Legislature. If a written
constitution was an attempt by the Founders to avoid the ambiguities of the
unwritten English constitution, then why should only the Court guard that
fixed meaning and why should Congress be allowed to violate that meaning
when interpreting? If the intent of the lawmaker or ratifier is inseparable
from the text, why should only the Court respect that intent when
interpreting the Constitution? The most likely response to these questions
would be that judicial supremacy renders legislative adherence to these two
standards unnecessary. But, as shown above, this trust in the abilities of
judicial supremacy is misplaced and unfounded. It is not difficult to
conceive of a legislative act that violates the fixed meaning and the original
intention of the ratifiers, but that is upheld by the Court or is never decided
on its merits. Something more is required to draw the line between
congressional and judicial interpretation.
There are two other potential arguments that Whittington might offer
to justify this distinction between the interpretive methods of the two
branches, each of which is suggested in his book. The first is the idea that
legislatures are unlikely to undertake the kind of research necessary to
86
The
engage in originalist interpretation and lack the expertise to do so.
second is that the political branches operate under very different
87
These arguments
assumptions and pressures than does the Judiciary.
about Congress's capacity for originalist interpretation highlight the great
weakness in the argument favoring the application of originalist theories to
the Legislature-the political and historical realities indicate that legislators
will not take this task seriously. That is not to say that legislators are lazy
or unconcerned with the Constitution; rather, it is to acknowledge, as
Whittington indicates, that different branches operate under different
assumptions and incentives, and Congress has little institutional or political
incentive to place itself under the direction of originalism when it
88
There is, therefore, a limit on how far an argument for
interprets.

86.
87.
88.
similar

See WHITrINGTON, supra note 5, at 78.

See id. at 80.
It should be noted that the originalists from the other four schools might also make a
argument, since up to this point this paper has essentially assumed that none of these
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originalist interpretation in legislative actions can go. While it appears that,
on a purely theoretical level, the originalist scholars presented in this paper
are compelled to accept originalism as a natural feature of their schools of
thought, the realities of legislative behavior indicate that such an argument
may be confined to theory and divorced from practice.
It should be said, however, that originalists suffer from a similar
problem when arguing for how their theories apply to the Judiciary.
Stephen Griffin points out that modern originalism does not describe the
Court's history of interpretation. "Pluralistic theories described accurately
that the Supreme Court employs multiple methods of interpretation in
deciding cases and does not observe a strict hierarchy of methods."89 He
further argues that "each contemporary method of interpretation is the result
of a tradition that extends back at least to the adoption of the
Constitution.'0 Johnathan O'Neill, in his history of originalist thought,
comments that "[t]raditional textual originalism and contemporary
originalism should not be ahistorically equated,"91 and it is incorrect to
argue that modem originalism was once considered orthodoxy on the Court.
The fact is that the Court's interpretive history is mixed and is not one
of strict adherence to originalist theory. It is possible that the institutional
incentives of the Court preclude it from remaining originalist for any
extended period of time. Bork's The Tempting of America was so named
for a reason-because he views the Court as being under a constant
temptation to utilize its power to achieve its own ends, regardless of the
original meaning of the Constitution:
[W]hen a judge realizes that in the case before him his strongly held
view of justice, his political and moral imperative, is not embodied in a
statute or in any provision of the Constitution. He must then choose
between his version of justice and abiding by the American form of
government. Yet the desire to do justice, whose nature seems to him
obvious, is compelling, while the concept of constitutional process is
abstract, rather arid, and the abstinence it counsels unsatisfying. To
give in to the temptation, this one time, solves an urgent human
problem, and a faint crack appears in the American foundation.

schools would argue for a relevant distinction between the two branches as it relates to their
capacities for originalist interpretation. It is possible the other four schools might argue, as
Whittington would, that regardless of the logic of their justifications for originalism they simply
assume that the Court is better able or more likely to implement originalist theories.
89. Griffin, supra note 2, at 1194-95.
90. Id. at 1196.
91. O'NEtLL, supra note 3, at 13.
92. BORK, supra note 35, at 1.
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Bork's argument is that a judge's almost plenary power over constitutional
interpretation impels him toward interpretive methodologies that allow him
to further his own authority and impose his personal views, something
originalism cannot countenance. This was exactly the fear that Brutus
raised in arguing against ratification of the Constitution: "The judges will
be interested to extend the powers of the courts, and to construe the
[C]onstitution as much as possible, in such a way as to favour it; and that
",93
Brutus specifically foresaw that judges
they will do it, appears probable.
would have the power, in largely nonoriginalist fashion, 9 4 to "explain the
constitution according to the reasoning spirit of it, without being confined
to the words or letter." 95
Originalist theorists have to contend with the fact that, to the extent
that originalism prevents judges from imposing their own personal views
and increasing their authority as they desire, it conflicts with the
institutional incentives and human impulses of the Court. While it might be
argued that recent successes in advancing originalism in the Judiciary prove
that originalist theory is not at odds with judicial incentives, Justice Scalia
rightly reminds originalists:
[I]t would be foolish to pretend that [originalism] has become (as it
once was) the dominant mode of interpretation in the courts, or even
that it is the irresistible wave of the future . . . . It is no easy task to
wean . . . the judiciar away from such a seductive and judge-

empowering philosophy.
Just as institutional and political incentives beckon legislators to not
take constitutional interpretation seriously, thereby making the prospect of
applying originalism to the Legislature seem impossible, these same factors
make daunting the task of imposing originalism on the Court. Political
realities may argue for the difficulty of applying originalism to Congress,
but those realities also augur ill for originalist attempts to bring about

93. THE LETTERSOF BRUTUSNo. 11.
94. Whittington and other originalists have made the case that originalism "should not

necessarily rule out a role for contemporary moral theorizing in realizing the promise of the
Constitution, but it still must insist on the priority of historical inquiry in faithful constitutional

interpretation." Whittington, supra note 2, at 208.
95. THE LETTERS OF BRUTus No. 11.
96. Antonin Scalia, Foreward, in ORIGINALIsM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 43

(Steven G. Calabresi, ed. 2007). I believe that Justice Scalia is incorrect in asserting that modem
originalism was ever the dominant mode of interpretation. O'Neill and Robert Clinton have
shown that a form of originalism was in place since Ratification, but it was a different kind of
originalism than is argued for today. See Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal
Realism, and the Interpretation of 'This Constitution,' 72 IowA L. REv. 1177, 1186-220 (19861987).
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originalism in the Judiciary for extended periods of time. If these realities
have not acted as fatal handicaps or serious flaws in originalist theory in the
past when it was being applied to the Court, there is no reason why it
should be so at the start of an argument in favor of originalism in the
Legislature.
CONCLUSION
The rebirth of originalism in the form of new originalism has led to a
reexamination of several originalist tenets by some of the most gifted
originalist scholars. Despite this outgrowth of new scholarship, originalist
literature continues to focus exclusively on the Judiciary and ignore the
implications of originalist theory for the Legislature. This paper seeks to
extend originalist theory to take Congress into account. The justifications
and assumptions inherent in various originalist schools of thought create an
obligation for the Legislature to interpret in-line with originalism. Because
this paper represents the initial salvo in the debate over originalism in the
Legislature, it is certain that important arguments and observations specific
to Congress have not yet been considered. A comprehensive analysis of
how originalism would apply to legislative actions and the internal
machinery of Congress is far beyond the scope of this paper. Future
scholars will likely undertake this task. It is the hope of this author that this
paper has made that task seem worthwhile.
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